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Abstract: In the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick, an automobilecompany
was held liable for negligence notwithstanding a lack of privity withthe injured
driver. Four decades later, in Henningsenv. Bloomfield Motors, the court held
unconscionable the standard automobilecompany warranty which limited its
responsibility to repair and replacement,even in a case involving physical injury.
This suggests a puzzle: if it were soeasy for firms to contract out of liability, did
MacPherson accomplish anything?
Keywords: MacPherson, Henningsen, personal injury law, negligence, warranty

Most first-year law students run into MacPherson v. Buick,1 “one of the most
influential [decisions] in our common law,”2 early on in their Torts class. At
Columbia a substantial fraction of them get the case even sooner in the twoweek boot camp known as Legal Methods. Cardozo held way back in 1916
that since Buick had been negligent, it was liable for MacPherson’s injuries
notwithstanding the fact that there was no contractual relationship between
the owner and manufacturer. Then, later in the semester, when I get the
students in Contracts, they read Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,3 a case
decided 44 years later. Ms Henningsen was injured when the steering
mechanism of her new Plymouth failed. Plymouth had included language
in its contract limiting its liability to repair or replacement. According to the

1 MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
2 Walter Probert, Applied Jurisprudence: A Case Study of Interpretive Reasoning in MacPherson
v. Buick and Its Precedents, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 789 (1987–88). It is Cardozo’s most-cited
opinion.
3 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 (1960). Farnsworth refers to the case as a
“landmark” decision. § 4.26.
*Corresponding author: Victor Goldberg, Jerome L. Greene, Professor of Transactional Law,
Columbia University School of Law 435 W. 116thSt, New York, NY, USA,
E-mail: vpg@law.columbia.edu
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court, Chrysler (Plymouth’s parent) argued that the language precluded it
being held liable for her physical injuries.4 The disclaimer, Judge Francis
suggested, was a deliberate industry ploy to avoid liability: “The judicial
process has recognized a right to recover damages for personal injuries
arising from a breach of that warranty. The disclaimer of the implied warranty and exclusion of all obligations except those specifically assumed by
the express warranty signify a studied effort to frustrate that protection.”5
After much anguished reasoning, he concluded that the damage limitation
was against public policy and therefore void.
Given the judge’s struggles to reach this conclusion, it seemed reasonable to
conclude that the judge was confronted with a body of precedent favoring
Chrysler. So, here’s the puzzle. If it turns out that it was easy to contract out
of liability and if auto companies (and other manufacturers) routinely did so, did
MacPherson accomplish anything? In the intervening 44 years did MacPherson
catch only those injurers whose counsel had failed to include routine liability
limitations in their standard forms? At least on its face it would appear that
MacPherson’s impact would have been minimal for four decades. Or, perhaps,
did doctrine distinguish between instances in which the manufacturer was
negligent (MacPherson) and those in which it was not (Henningsen)? Or did
courts use some other device to avoid contractual damage limitations?
It’s all moot now. Henningsen appeared right before the start of the product
liability revolution.6 That, coupled with 2–719(3),7 of the UCC meant that auto
companies could no longer contract out of liability for personal injury. Still, it
would be nice to know how (or if) MacPherson remained relevant in the decades
preceding the revolution if manufacturers could limit their liability
contractually.
It turns out that it did remain relevant—there were lots of personal injury
cases against the automobile companies. In a study of product liability in the
automobile industry that appeared just before the Henningsen decision came
down, Professor Cornelius Gillam collected all the automobile product liability

4 The Henningsens also sued the dealer, Bloomfield Motors. MacPherson, however, did not sue
the dealer, Close Brothers. (MacPherson Brief, p. 22)
5 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 404. (emphasis added)
6 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d. 57 (1963) was decided 2 ½ years after
Henningsen (May 1960-January 1963).
7 “Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is
commercial is not.”
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cases.8 The list is long—11 pages.9 Why, or how, did these plaintiffs manage to
avoid the disclaimer?
One possible hypothesis is that the disclaimer was of recent origin. That
turns out to be false. The repair and replace limitation appeared in contracts
even before MacPherson was decided.
From the start, most automakers included broad clauses requiring dealers to maintain
repair facilities, but they soon added two clauses restricting their liability. One concerned
the limited nature of their warranties. Ford led the way: Its 1904 agreement reprinted the
industry trade association’s standard warranty (adopted in 1902). The company would
replace defective parts only for the first sixty days after the car buyer received the
vehicle.10

In 1929 two law professors had their students collect warranties from a variety
of industries, including automobile distributors and manufacturers.11 The standard automobile warranty remedy they found was limited to repair and
replace.12 The authors’ interpretation was that there would be no recovery for
physical injury:
Thus, to put an extreme case, if one purchases an automobile under the standard warranty, and while driving it in a normal way within ninety days after delivery, an axle
breaks and the buyer is killed, his representative may be limited to a return of the broken
axle to the factory at his own expense and the obtaining of a new axle. There can be no

8 CORNELIUS GILLAM, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (University of
Minnesota Press 1960). While the copyright is 1960, the Preface is dated June 1959.
Henningsen was argued 7 December 1959 and decided 9 May 1960.
9 Most, but not all, of the cases involved personal injury.
10 Sally H. Clark, Unmanageable Risks: Macpherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a Mass
Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 25 (2005). The contract in Ford Motor Co. v. Osburn,
140 Ill.App. 633 (1908) included a damage limitation, “this warranty being limited to the
replacement in our factory of all parts giving out under normal service in consequence of defect
of material or of workmanship.” (At 635) Ford had sold the car directly to the customer so there
was not a privity issue.
11 George G. Bogert and Eli E. Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods,
25 ILL. L. REV. 400 (1930–31).
12 “Warrant each new motor vehicle manufactured by us, whether passenger car or commercial
vehicle, to be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service, our
obligation under this warranty being limited to making good at our factory any part or parts
thereof which shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original
purchaser, be returned to us with transportation charges prepaid, and which our examination
shall disclose to our satisfaction to have been thus defective; this warranty being expressly in
lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied and of all other obligations or liabilities on our
part, and we neither assume nor authorize any other person to assume for us any other liability
in connection with the sale of our vehicles.” Id. at 409.
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recovery for the destruction of the remainder of the car or for the death of the buyer,
although both were obviously proximately caused by the breach of warranty that the axle
was of sound materials and good workmanship.13

That would seem to doom the plaintiff’s case. However, Gillam noted “one
utterly amazing fact:”
[T]he automobile manufacturers have vigorously resisted plaintiffs’ attempts to charge
them with tort liability for dangerous defects in their vehicles, but they never have invoked
the standard warranty in defense of an action for personal injury. Whether this is due to
charity, oversight, or fear of the ultimate consequences of carrying the disclaimer too far, it
is impossible to say.
But it does result in a legal windfall to the consumer. What the standard warranty says, in
plain English, is that the manufacturer is not liable for anything beyond discretionary
replacement of parts within the warranty period.14

He continued: “But the consumer does sue in tort, and successfully. The disclaimer simply isn’t mentioned by either party, and the case is decided on
straight MacPherson principles.”15
Actually, in one significant case cited in Henningsen, the warranty limitation was used successfully against an injured buyer, but by the dealer not the
manufacturer. Ironically, the manufacturer’s loss was due to its lack of privity.
In Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,16 the driver was injured when a pebble struck the
car’s windshield dislodging a sliver of glass which struck the driver who lost
an eye. Baxter sued for breach of warranty, but did not sue for negligence. Ford
and the dealer had both included the repair and replace warranty and the court
upheld the dealer’s limitation. However, the court held that the Ford warranty
limitation did not apply because Ford had not been in a contractual relationship with Baxter. Instead, the court identified an express warranty in Ford’s
claims that the glass was shatterproof. “We hold that the catalogues and
printed matter furnished by respondent Ford Motor Company for distribution
and assistance in sales … were improperly excluded from evidence, because
they set forth representations by the manufacturer that the windshield of the
car which appellant bought contained Triplex nonshatterable glass which
would not fly or shatter.”17 The case was remanded to the jury to admit
Baxter’s evidence on his reliance on the representation and whether the failure

13
14
15
16
17

Id. at 413.
GILLAM, supra note 8, at 192. (emphasis in original)
Id. at 193.
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff’d, 168 Wash. 456, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
Id. at 463.
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to install shatterproof glass was the proximate cause of the injury. The jury
found in Baxter’s favor.18
Because the decision was based on the express warranty that the glass
was nonshatterable, the questions of whether Ford had been negligent or
whether the automobile or the windshield were “inherently dangerous” were
irrelevant. Ford had some pretty good arguments on those grounds. Ford
argued that the windshield hadn’t shattered, invoking the dictionary definition: “To break at once into pieces; to dash, burst, or part violently into
fragments; to rend into splinters, as an explosion shatters a rock; an oak
shattering by lightning.”19 The windshield had not shattered; a few tiny
pieces had been dislodged and one happened to hit Baxter’s eye. The windshield design, Ford claimed, was not negligent because there was no superior
shatterproof windshield on the market. And, it continued, Baxter had not
relied on the statements since, Ford claimed, he would have bought the car
anyway. Astonishingly, the Baxters had continued to drive the car without
replacing the windshield for another 14,000 miles up until the date of the
trial—the windshield was finally removed only for the purpose of placing it
into evidence!20
In response to Baxter’s argument that the windshield was inherently
dangerous21 Ford said that the windshield was “not per se a dangerous
instrumentality. The cases cited by counsel on this question are cases
where automobiles became dangerous instrumentalities, intrinsically and
inherently dangerous by reason of some latent, hidden defect in workmanship or in material such as rotten spokes in a wheel … or other defects
rendering the machine intrinsically and inherently dangerous so that injury
to person and property is almost certain to occur when used in way in which
it is intended to be used.”22 The rotten spokes were, of course, the basis for
liability in MacPherson. So, Ford conceded that it could have been held liable
under MacPherson if the defect had rendered the windshield or automobile
inherently dangerous. But the court did not say whether the defendant could

18 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934) (“The case was retried on June
27 and 28, 1933. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the present respondent upon which, after
a denial of motions for judgment non obstante veredicto, or for a new trial, judgment was
entered.”)
19 Ford Brief, p. 78.
20 Ford Brief, pp. 35–36.
21 Baxter Brief, pp. 41–45.
22 Ford Brief, pp. 101–102.
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have limited its liability for negligence with an express warranty limitation.
The trial court suggested that it could not:
No attempt was made to prove any cause of action founded upon negligence in permitting
a defective pane of glass to be sold, and this fact was commented upon by the trial judge
when he said: ‘Gentleman, I think the contention made on the part of the defendant is well
taken. If you had alleged a defect in the manufacture of the glass itself, I would be inclined
to hold for the plaintiff. There is no allegation in here that the glass was not properly
manufactured. If it was not properly manufactured it would come within the rule laid
down in those cases like the faulty wheel.23

This seems to suggest that the repair and replace warranty would work if
there were no negligence, but it would not had there been negligence. But
that is not clear. In a contemporary decision, Doughnut Mach. Corp. v.
Bibbey,24 the court found liability holding that the language fell “far short
of being a plain agreement that the lessees should assume liability for
personal injury.”25 This does suggest that some alternative language would
have shielded the defendant from liability. The Restatement (First) Contracts
did not bar such liability disclaimers: “A bargain for exemption from liability
for the consequences of negligence not falling greatly below the standard
established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm, is legal except in the cases stated in § 575.” The exceptions in the later
section did not include injuries from products. So, while there does not
appear to have been a legal barrier to invoking a properly designed damage
limitation even when the defendant was negligent, there was, as Gillam had
noted, a strong presumption against doing so.
Just because the automobile companies did not invoke the disclaimer in
personal injury cases, we should not conclude that the disclaimer was merely
superfluous language with no legal effect. The disclaimer was invoked successfully in cases in which the damage was to the vehicle, cases that did not involve
personal injury. For example, one of the decisions cited in Henningsen, Shafer v.
Reo Motors, Inc.,26 recognized the repair and replace remedy for breach of the
express warranty when the defect caused a fire that destroyed the vehicle. And
there were plenty more.27

23 Quoted in St. John Motors Brief, p. 7.
24 65 F.2d 634 (1933).
25 Id. at 637.
26 205 F.2d 685 (1953).
27 See Hummer v. Carmalt, 295 F. 978, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (“Not only did the parties agree that
there should be no understandings or representations of any kind, other than those contained
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This gives us at least a partial answer to the puzzle. The two doctrines coexisted
because the auto manufacturers were content to invoke the disclaimer only for claims
regarding the car itself, not for personal injury. The answer is only partial because it
does not identify which of Gillam’s possible motives (if any) would explain the
difference. Gillam’s summary of the case law suggests one possible rationale. The
manufacturers’ defenses in personal injury cases at that time were sufficient to
successfully defend against most personal injury claims Proving negligence or
reliance on a particular warranty was not easy.28 Defendants could also invoke
privity, contributory negligence, owner’s duty to inspect, and other doctrines to
avoid liability. Gillam provides numerous examples of cases demonstrating the
difficulties faced by plaintiffs and spanning the full range of possible defects,

in the contract, but the express warranty contained the provision that it was ‘in lieu of all other
warranties, expressed or implied. In addition, the scope of this standard warranty was sufficiently broad to preclude the plaintiff from recovering under an implied warranty”); Oldfield v.
Int’l Motor Co., 138 Md. 35, 113 A. 632, 636 (1921) (“The plaintiff’s first prayer was properly
rejected because the defendant did not guarantee that the truck was fit or suitable for the work
for which it was purchased, and the contract expressly provided: ‘No guarantee express or
implied other than herein stated is made by the company.’”); and Knecht v. Universal Motor Co.,
113 N.W.2d 688, 694 (N.D. 1962) (“In this case the buyer’s written order excluded all warranties,
express or implied, other than the dealer’s warranty that was printed on the back of the buyer’s
order. The same warranty also appeared on the service policy furnished to the plaintiff. It stated
that it was expressly in lieu of all warranties express or implied. The plaintiff testified that he
knew what the dealer’s warranty provided. It is clear that at the time the sale was made implied
warranties were negated and disclaimed. Under the weight of authority, including prior decisions of this court, such a disclaimer is valid and effective.”).
28 A few years after Baxter, the plaintiff, injured by glass from a shattered windshield, lost her
claim for a breach of warranty:
[The ads] state the dangers of ordinary glass which, if it breaks, scatters jagged chunks and
sharp, dangerous pieces, liable to cut and leave scars, and they assert that safety glass in the
windshield is standard equipment, that such glass ‘all-around’ provides ‘the greatest available
protection against all that,’ and that it is reckless not to make sure that a new car is equipped
with safety glass ‘all-around’; that is, in windows as well as windshield. The essential idea
conveyed by the advertisements is that safety glass furnishes ‘the greatest available protection’
against injury from flying fragments of glass and that a purchaser who is not reckless will have
his car so equipped throughout. No fair reading of the language can construe it as representing
that safety glass is unbreakable or that no possible type of collision can cause it to fly about in
dangerous fragments. Despite Mrs Rachlin’s testimony that the words ‘safety glass’ conveyed to
her mind the impression that ‘I would be safe and free from harm from flying glass,’ the court
could not have permitted the jury to find that the defendant had made such a representation.
Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F. 2d 597 (1938).
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including defective designs29 steering,30 brakes,31 wheels,32 roofs,33 and doors.34
Whatever the reason for the manufacturer’s reluctance, we now know why in the
44 years following MacPherson the plaintiffs in personal injury cases were not
hindered by the manufacturer’s disclaimers.
***
Which brings us to Henningsen. There was neither negligence (MacPherson)
nor an express warranty (Baxter). The claim was that there was an implied
warranty of merchantability from both the dealer, Bloomfield, and the manufacturer, Chrysler. Ten days after the purchase of a new Plymouth, Ms
Henningsen was injured in an accident when the steering wheel spun and the
car veered sharply off the road and into a wall. The front end of the car was so
badly damaged that it was “impossible to determine if any of the parts of the
steering wheel mechanism or workmanship or assembly were defective or
improper prior to the accident.”35 The trial judge concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to find negligence against either Chrysler or the dealer.
The dealer contract included the standard express warranty limiting its responsibility to repair and replace. Chrysler had the same warranty language, but it
argued that it was not in privity with the Henningsens, unless the judge or jury
found that its relationship with the dealer was an agency relationship; that
would have contradicted the express language of the sales agreement between
Chrysler and Bloomfield.36
The trial judge charged the jury as follows; “A provision in a purchase order
for an automobile that an express warranty shall exclude all implied warranties
will not be given effect so as to defeat an implied warranty that the machine
shall be fit for purposes for which it was intended unless its inclusion in the
contract was fairly procured or obtained.”37 He further instructed the jury: “As I
29 See Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (C.C.A, 6 Ky., 1930) and Zahn v. Ford Motor Co.,
164 F. Supp. 936 (D.C.Minn. 1958).
30 See Hirst v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 261 Mass. 155 (1927) and Hupp Motor Car Co. v. Wadsworth,
113 F.2d 827 (C.C.A. 6, 1940).
31 See Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N,E, 529 (1934), reversing 267 Ill. App. 68
(1932).
32 See Martin v. Studebaker Corp., 102 N.J.L. 612 (1926) and Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123
Utah 515 (1953).
33 See Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash, 2d 180 (1940).
34 See Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 265 (C.C.A. 5, Ga., 1935) and Miles v. Chrysler Corp.,
238 Ala. 359 (1939).
35 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 369.
36 Henningsen Brief, p. 10. (“The franchise agreement itself disclaims any intention to create
the relationship of principal and agent.”)
37 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 405.
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understand the issue here, it means that when the defendant Chrysler
Corporation manufactured the Plymouth car which the plaintiffs bought, it
would be for you to say whether or not there was an implied warranty to the
plaintiffs that the automobile was reasonably suited for ordinary use. In fact,
that is what they warranted. When they made the car, they said ‘That car is
reasonably suited for ordinary use.’”38 The jury found for the plaintiff.
In its brief to the Supreme Court, Bloomfield argued that it was free to
contract out of liability, even for negligence:
It should be unquestionably clear that defendant, Bloomfield Motors Inc. has the absolute
right to limit its liability based on warranty since warranty, under the Uniform Sales Act, is
in the nature of a contractual obligation. The Court’s attention is specifically directed to the
case of Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc. … The contract for purchase agreement contained a 90
day-4,000 mile proviso with a disclaimer appearing to be identical to that of Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. The Court held: ‘There is no rule of public policy which invalidates provisions
limiting liability for negligence, or otherwise, as between the buyer and the seller. The
buyer is under no compulsion to buy from the seller and, if the buyer desires to buy from
the seller, the buyer has the choice of accepting the seller’s terms or going elsewhere. … It
is my judgment that the provision of the “Standard Warranty” expressly releasing the
defendant from “all other obligations or liabilities on our part” is all inclusive, embracing
any claims which might arise either for breach of warranty or breach of duty based on
negligence.39

Chrysler’s position was a bit trickier; it argued that the contract between
Bloomfield and the Henningsens should effectively bar a claim on express or
implied warranty for both the manufacturer and the dealer. Alternatively, the
bar should be effective only for the dealer, but that in that case the manufacturer
would not be liable because there was no privity and that the absence of privity
eliminated any implied warranty. “That is not a warranty of Chrysler. This is a
warranty by Bloomfield Motors paraphrasing the standard warranty that the
automobile manufacturers’ association has but which has not been extended
by Chrysler Corporation to either Mr or Mrs Henningsen, and there is no proof of
any extension of any express warranty along the lines of these two papers.”40
This does suggest another puzzle, one which I won’t resolve. Why, if a manufacturer believes that a contractual limitation of liability would be enforceable,
would it structure its dealings so that it could avoid privity with the end user?

38 Chrysler Brief, p. 13.
39 Bloomfield Brief, pp. 14–17. Citing Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 659, 661 (W.D. Pa.
1952), aff’d, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); Shafer did not involve personal injury.
40 Appendix to Defendant’s Brief, 213a.
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Chrysler conceded that it would be liable for fault (although, unlike
Bloomfield, it said nothing about whether it could limit its liability by
contract):
I am not saying that Chrysler does not have an obligation. I admit that Chrysler has an
obligation to the world, not only to Ms. Henningsen, but to everybody in the world. If
somebody were standing on a street corner and a car came along and the person standing
on the street corner got hurt as a result of some failure on the part of Chrysler to perform its
obligation, Chrysler would be held liable, but the obligation is this: To exercise reasonable
care in the performance of the manufacturing process to produce a product that is reasonably fit for the purpose intended.41

However, it argued against liability without fault: “The bald substantive question … is whether a manufacturer is absolutely liable to one who is injured
because there was a defect in the item when it was sold by the retailer.”42 The
plaintiffs’ claim, Chrysler asserted, was based on recent legal scholarship, not
the law of New Jersey:
The plaintiff’s suggestion boils down to the thought thrown out by Dean Prosser and
Professors Harper and James that perhaps a manufacturer should be the “guarantor of his
product, even though he had exercised all reasonable care.” … .
The concept of absolute liability has never been applied in this state even with respect to
matters which are inherently dangerous.43

Henningsen made explicit what had been implicit in the 44 years since
MacPherson. Contractual limitations of liability for personal injury would not
be enforced. Henningsen went further, endorsing the “thoughts thrown out by
Dean Prosser and Professors Harper and James,” albeit only in the context of
automobile accidents.
Francis’s holding that the warranty was not enforceable amounted to finding strict liability for defects for automobiles. His opinion emphasized the
specific features of the automobile market that led to his conclusion. One set
of factors involved the nature of the standard form. The warranty limitation was
on the back of the form in six-point type, while the bulk of the contract was in
twelve-point type; the language did not clearly convey to a purchaser that the
limitation would be applicable to physical injury. A second set of factors
involved the nature of the automobile industry itself. “The status of the

41 Appendix to Defendant’s Brief, 215a.
42 Chrysler Brief, p. 13.
43 Chrysler Brief, p. 37.
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automobile industry is unique. Manufacturers are few in number and strong in
bargaining position.”44
The form warranty is not only standard with Chrysler but … it is the uniform warranty
of the Automobile Manufacturers Association. Members of the Association are:
General Motors, Inc., Ford, Chrysler, Studebaker-Packard, American Motors,
(Rambler), Willys Motors, Checker Motors Corp., and International Harvester
Company. … Of these companies, the ‘Big Three’ (General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler) represented 93.5% Of the passenger-car production for 1958 and the independents 6.5 … And for the same year the ‘Big Three’ had 86.72% of the total
passenger vehicle registrations.45

Would Judge Francis have reached the same result had that contract language
been in big print and clearly explained to the Henningsens and if the industry
were relatively unconcentrated and firms competed on warranty terms? Today,
the industry is much less concentrated and there is competition on warranty
terms. Had that been the case in 1955, when the Henningsens bought the car,
Judge Francis would have been hard-pressed to make his unconscionability
argument. That does not mean that the Henningsens would have lost Rather, I
suspect that the judge would have ignored contract questions, rejected
Chrysler’s primary argument—no privity—and instead have confronted the tort
question directly, moving toward adopting strict liability for defects for personal
injuries. Perhaps.
Henningsen might have hastened the adoption of strict product liability. On
the eve of the decision, Gillam wrote presciently:
Doubtless the first case in which the standard warranty is offered as a defense to an action
for damages for personal injuries will mark the entrance of automobile products liability
law upon a new and different phase, in which either the old doctrine of caveat emptor will
be fully restored in the guise of freedom of contract, or, more probably, legislative
consideration of the pros and cons of liability without fault will bring the developing
law of products liability to the ultimate end toward which its logic points so
compellingly.46

As it turned out, legislative consideration was unnecessary.
Returning to the puzzle, my inference was wrong. The automobile companies did not use the warranty limitation to marginalize MacPherson. But it
was not my fault. Judge Francis deceived me—and everybody else. He mischaracterized the manufacturer’s intent regarding the disclaimer. It was not,
44 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 403.
45 Id. at 390–391.
46 GILLAM, supra note 8, at 176.
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as he claimed, a devious device imposed by powerful manufacturers on
helpless, and misled, customers to deprive them of their right to sue for
personal injuries.47 Chrysler, and the rest, had been successful in containing
their exposure by a strategy of no negligence, no privity. True, they could
have invoked the disclaimer, but in the 44 years following MacPherson, they
hadn’t.

47 “It seems obvious in this instance that the motive was to avoid the warranty obligations
which are normally incidental to such sales. The language gave little and withdrew much. In
return for the delusive remedy of replacement of defective parts at the factory, the buyer is said
to have accepted the exclusion of the maker’s liability for personal injuries arising from the
breach of the warranty, and to have agreed to the elimination of any other express or implied
warranty. An instinctively felt sense of justice cries out against such a sharp bargain.”
Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 388.

